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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHO’S THE BOSS: THE DEFINITION OF A SUPERVISOR
IN WORKPLACE HARASSMENT UNDER
VANCE V. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION
Yasharay Mack works as a mechanic for the Otis Elevator Company.1 She
is assigned to work at the Metropolitan Life building in New York City.2
James Connolly, another employee of the company, holding the position of
“mechanic in charge,” also works at this site.3 Connolly is the senior employee
at the site and has the authority to direct Mack’s work activities, but does not
have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline her.4
While at work, Connolly frequently makes sexual comments to Mack,
regularly changes out of his uniform in front of her, constantly boasts about his
sexual exploits, and has even pulled her onto his lap while trying to kiss her.5
Mack decides she wants to sue, claiming sexual harassment; how likely is the
company to be held liable?6
Before June 2013, the answer to this question mostly depended on which
court heard the case.7 According to the Second Circuit in Mack v. Otis
Elevator, it is very likely the company would have been held liable.8 The
Second Circuit defines a “supervisor” as someone who not only has the ability
to take or recommend tangible employment actions against an employee, but
could also have the ability to control an employee’s daily activities.9 However,
if this case were brought before the Seventh Circuit, the company likely would

1. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 120, 126; see also Jodi R. Mandell, Mack v. Otis Elevator: Creating More
Supervisors and Vicarious Liability for Workplace Harassment, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 521, 525
(2005).
5. Mack, 326 F.3d at 120.
6. Id. at 122.
7. See infra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
8. Mandell, supra note 4, at 522. In Mack v. Otis Elevator, the case which the situation
described above is based on, the Second Circuit broadly interpreted the term “supervisor” to
apply to those who had the authority to create a hostile work environment. Id.
9. Keith Muse, Seeking Supervision: An Analysis of Recent Trends in the Definition of
‘Supervisor’ Argument and a Recommendation for the Eleventh Circuit, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
491, 491–92 (2005).
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not have been held liable because Connolly did not have the power to take
tangible employment actions against Mack.10
The reason for the conflicting results for liability in the above situation was
a direct result of the holdings from Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.11 In those cases, the Supreme Court held that
an employer is presumptively liable when an employee’s “supervisor” creates
a sexually hostile work environment but failed to define what qualified
someone as a “supervisor” or address liability standards for other kinds of
workers.12 Subsequently, when hearing hostile environment claims, the lower
courts decided that when the alleged harasser was considered a co-worker, and
not a supervisor, the aggrieved employee had to prove the employer was
negligent in handling the situation for vicarious liability to attach.13 Therefore,
by opting for a negligence standard, the courts incentivized employers to argue
that the alleged harasser was not actually a supervisor, which was the decision
the Supreme Court failed to provide guidance for, and made the determination
of the alleged harasser’s status paramount to the situation.14
Following Ellerth and Faragher, the circuits were undoubtedly split on
deciding what should qualify someone as a “supervisor” under Title VII, with
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits applying a rather “extreme position” and other
circuits adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s position.15
Generally, the EEOC’s broad position is that for Title VII purposes the
definition of a “supervisor” includes those who have the limited authority to
only direct another employee’s daily tasks, workload, and activities, drawing
the line well before the ability to take tangible actions.16 This circuit split

10. Id. This approach taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is known as the
“narrow view.” Id. at 492.
11. See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
12. Stephanie Ann Henning Blackman, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts’
Confusion Regarding the Definition of “Supervisor,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 123, 124 (2001). Even
though Ellerth and Faragher addressed sexual harassment issues, the courts have since applied
these holdings to other types of hostile environment claims as well, including race-based claims.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 n.3 (2013).
13. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440–41; see, e.g., Williams v. Waste Mgmt. of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021,
1029 (7th Cir. 2004); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004); Joens
v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004).
14. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2437 (“Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace
harassment may depend on the status of the harasser.”).
15. Catherine L. Fisk, Supervisors in a World of Flat Hierarchies, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1403,
1406–07 (2013).
16. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/harassment.html.
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would finally be resolved when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Vance
v. Ball State University.17
In Vance v. Ball State University, the Supreme Court addressed the
question it had left open fifteen years prior in Ellerth and Faragher of who
qualifies as a “supervisor” in cases where an employee asserts a Title VII claim
for workplace harassment.18 Resolving the diverging views, the Supreme Court
held in Vance that an employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII if they are empowered by the employer to take
“tangible employment actions” against the victim.19
Therefore, in Vance, the Court chose the restrictive “supervisor” definition,
which ties supervisor liability to the ability to exercise significant control.20
This Note argues that the difficulty the majority and dissenting opinions in
Vance v. Ball State University had in defining who should qualify as a
“supervisor” proves that the distinction between supervisors and co-workers is
impracticable for Title VII purposes. This Note then proposes a unitary,
alternative standard.
This Note initially provides an overview of employment discrimination
law under Title VII and gives a background on important decisions prior to the
judgment in Vance, highlighting the landmark holdings from Ellerth and
Faragher. It continues by analyzing the procedural history of the Vance case,
along with a recitation of the relevant facts. Additionally, a discussion
concerning the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito21 will be
followed by a discussion regarding the vigorous dissent penned by Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.22 Culminating, this Note will propose an alternative solution
to addressing hostile work environment claims under Title VII, setting forth a
standard that discards the need to differentiate between supervisors and coworkers, and discuss the possible implications. Concluding, there will be a
brief recapitulation of the issue and why the new proposal will prove to be a
logical resolution.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an “unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.
Id. at 2439.
Id.
See id. at 2443.
Id. at 2439.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2454.
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origin.”23 Employees who suffer discrimination are able to recover damages or
other remedies from their employers.24 Moreover, Title VII clearly prohibits
discrimination in regards to employment actions that have direct economic
consequences, such as discharges, demotions, and pay cuts, but there was
confusion regarding whether it reached discrimination that did not directly
result in economic misfortune.25 Shortly after the enactment of Title VII, some
of the lower federal courts addressed this confusion and held Title VII to reach
the “creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.”26
A.

Rogers Lays the Groundwork

Legal scholars regularly cite Rogers v. EEOC as the first case to recognize
a hostile work environment as a form of illegal employment discrimination,
particularly for racial discrimination.27 In that case, a Hispanic employee
alleged that her employers, two optometrists, segregated their patients by
color-coding their office forms by race, using red ink for Black customers and
blue ink for non-Black customers.28 The EEOC, on behalf of the plaintiff,
argued that even though the actions were not directed at the plaintiff, they
“could ‘create an atmosphere that would adversely affect the terms and
conditions of her employment.’”29 In the holding, the Fifth Circuit believed
that it must be “acutely conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate
the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and
humiliation of ethnic discrimination.”30 Exercising this “liberal interpretation,”
the court went on to say that “the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment’ in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.”31 However, the Fifth Circuit was
quick to establish that this holding did not apply to an employer’s “mere
utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet” that may offend an employee or group
of employees.32 But by the same token, the Rogers court explained that a
discriminatory atmosphere under certain circumstances could constitute an

23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2006).
24. Id. § 2000e–5(g).
25. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440.
26. Id.; see also infra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Pat K. Chew & Robert
E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 50–51
(2006).
28. Chew & Kelley, supra note 27, at 55.
29. Id.
30. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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unlawful employment practice.33 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that “[o]ne
can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological
stability of minority group workers, and [we] think Section 703 of Title VII
was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.”34
B.

The Supreme Court Recognizes a Hostile Work Environment

In light of the Rogers decision, lower courts began holding that, in a charge
of a racially hostile work environment, the employer is liable only if the
injured party can prove that the employer was negligent, i.e., that the employer
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to take remedial
action.35 This issue of vicarious employer liability ultimately reached the
Supreme Court in 1986, in the case of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
but the Court declined to decide it.36 Instead, the Court focused their holding
on finding that a claim of “hostile environment” sex discrimination is
actionable under Title VII.37
The Supreme Court in Meritor gave credit to the Fifth Circuit for first
recognizing a cause of action based on a discriminatory work environment in
Rogers.38 On an interesting side note, the Court incorrectly recalled Rogers as
involving a Hispanic employee complaining that her employers discriminated
against their “Hispanic clientele,”39 when in fact, the case involved a Hispanic
employee complaining about discrimination towards the Black clientele.40
Regardless of this oversight, the Court readily applied the established principle
for racial harassment to sexual harassment, noting that “[n]othing in Title VII
suggests that a hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment
should not be likewise prohibited.”41 However, the Court failed to articulate
exactly what factors it considered in deciding whether the alleged harassment
actually constituted a hostile work environment.42 The Supreme Court

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767–69 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing to a string of cases in support of this proposition).
36. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The issue in Meritor was
raised not in the context of racial discrimination, but rather sexual harassment, which has
subsequently become the focus of discriminatory harassment jurisprudence. Id. at 65–66; see also
infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
37. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
38. Id. at 65.
39. Id. at 65–66.
40. Chew & Kelley, supra note 27, at 55.
41. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
42. Shannon Murphy, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work
Environment “Hostile”?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 857, 864 (1987).
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provided some clarity, but not much more, in regard to what specifically
constituted a hostile work environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.43 In
that case, the Court held that the workplace needed to be permeated with such
severe or pervasive discrimination that it altered the conditions of the victim’s
employment and created an abusive working environment.44 Explaining this
standard, the Court stated that it took a “middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury.”45
II. THE LANDMARK DECISIONS
First and perhaps foremost, the Meritor decision is additionally critical for
what the Supreme Court declined to decide. The parties in that case wanted a
definitive ruling on vicarious employer liability, but the Court refused to do so,
expressly declining to create a general standard for employer liability in Title
VII sexual harassment cases.46 In coming to this conclusion, the Court felt the
record was too bare for such an impactful ruling, as the district court did not
resolve the conflicting testimony about the true existence of a sexual
relationship between the employee and her supervisor.47 More specifically, the
Court did not know “whether [the supervisor] made any sexual advances
toward respondent at all,” let alone how pervasive or serious they potentially
were.48 In light of the bare factual record, the Court still discussed in dicta the
employer’s potential liability, just as the district and appellate courts had done
before.49 In doing so, the Court agreed with the EEOC and Congress and
wanted courts to look at agency principles for guidance in these situations.50
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the Court endorsed the idea that
employers are not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors.51

43. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”)
46. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
47. Id. at 61, 72.
48. Id. at 72.
49. Id. at 69–70.
50. Id. at 72. The EEOC’s argument was presented by an amicus brief and highlighted that
Congress has focused on directing courts to be guided by agency principles when hearing issues
of employer liability. Ronald Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII for Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment by Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath of Meritor Savings
Bank, 33 HOW. L.J. 1, 29 (1990).
51. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

A.

WHO’S THE BOSS

945

Ellerth and Faragher: The Framework

Twelve years later, on the last day of the 1997–1998 term, the Supreme
Court further developed this area, fashioning an intelligible vicarious liability
rule for employers when their supervisors harass their employees.52 The
holding was first articulated in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and was
subsequently adopted later that same day in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.53
1.

Crafting an Affirmative Defense

The Court explained that when no tangible employment action is taken, the
employer is presumptively liable for a supervisor’s harassment that results in a
hostile work environment.54 The defending employer, nonetheless, may raise
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, and must prove that the
employer took reasonable measures to prevent and remedy the harassment and
that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of those measures.55
However, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a discharge,
demotion, or undesirable assignment—basically any tangible employment
action—no affirmative defense is available, and the employer is automatically
vicariously liable.56
The Court believed that by limiting liability for employers who
implemented anti-harassment procedures, Title VII’s “‘primary objective’” of
preventing workplace discrimination was being satisfied.57 Conceivably, this
limited liability was thought to incentivize the development of effective sexual
harassment policies, and, thus, would have an ultimate positive effect on
preventing workplace discrimination.58
2.

Applying Agency Principles

In coming to a conclusion, the Court looked to agency principles as the
Meritor decision previously instructed.59 First, the Court alluded to section
219(1) of the Restatement of Agency that defines the principle of agency law
as “[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment.”60 In essence, an employer may
52. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 41 (1999).
53. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998).
54. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 765.
56. Id.
57. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 206–07 (2004).
58. Id. at 207.
59. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755.
60. Id. at 755–56 (internal quotation marks omitted).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

946

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:939

be held liable for both the negligent and intentional torts committed by
employees within the scope of their employment.61 Intentional torts can fall
under the “scope of employment” umbrella when the conduct is “‘actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],’ even if [the conduct] is
forbidden by the employer.”62 However, as it has been commonly recognized,
the general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor does not qualify as
conduct within the scope of employment.63
Even though sexual harassment is found to fall outside of the scope of
employment, the Court noted there are other agency principles that could
define the basis for employer liability.64 In these situations, where the conduct
falls outside of the scope of employment, the Court turned to section 219(2) of
the Restatement of Agency, and particularly subsections (b) and (d).65 Under
subsection (b) an employer is liable when the tort is traceable to the employer’s
own negligence, and thus, even though the harassment was outside of the
scope of employment, the employer can be liable.66 Under subsection (d), the
concern is vicarious liability for torts committed by an employee when the
employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship.67 However, the Court realized that, in a sense, most workplace
tortfeasors are aided in their tortious activity by the existence of the agency
relationship.68 The Court found this to be too broad and decided that the
“agency in relation” standard required the existence of something more than
simply the relationship itself.69
Initially, the Court determined a class of cases where more than the
existence of an employment relationship aided in the harassment—when a
supervisor’s harassment results in tangible employment actions.70 To recap, a
“tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.”71 Therefore, it logically follows that when a supervisor
makes a tangible employment decision, it is axiomatic that the injury could not

61. Id. at 756. The Court provided the example that when a salesperson lies to a customer in
order to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of employment because it benefits
the employer by increasing sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 756–57.
64. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 758–59.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 760.
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 761.
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have resulted absent the agency relationship, and thus the decision vicariously
becomes the act of the employer.72
What is far more difficult to determine is whether the agency relationship
aids in the supervisor’s harassing activities that do not result in a tangible
employment action.73 The Court looked to accommodate both the principles of
vicarious liability for harm caused by the inappropriate use of supervisory
authority and Title VII’s underlying policies of encouraging employer’s to
create policies that help prevent this type of conduct.74 Thus, the Court came to
its final conclusion, holding that employers are strictly liable for their
supervisor’s harassing conduct that results in tangible employment actions and
are presumptively liable when the acts result in a hostile work environment.75
However, an employer can raise an affirmative defense that the employer took
reasonable measures to prevent and remedy the harassment and the employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of those measures to rebut said
presumption.76 Later that same day, the Court applied this new framework in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.77 As a result of this new framework, it is
critical whether the harasser is a “supervisor or simply a co-worker.”78
Accordingly, in a hostile work environment case, whether the alleged harasser
is a supervisor or not has a determinative impact on the elements that the
plaintiff must prove and the defenses available to the defendant.79
3.

Leaving the Door Open

Even though the distinction between a supervisor and a co-worker is vital
in applying the Ellerth and Faragher standard, those holdings still left open the
question of who exactly qualifies as a supervisor.80 Looking at the facts of each
case, it becomes apparent why the Court left this question open—the status of
the alleged harassers was never in dispute.81 In Ellerth, the alleged harasser,
Ted Slowik, was a supervisor “under any definition of the term.”82 Slowik, a
72. See id. at 762.
73. Id. at 763.
74. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
78. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
79. Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
Furthermore, the court stated that it was “of great benefit to defendants for the harasser to be a coemployee rather than a supervisor.” Id. at 910 n.2.
80. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439.
81. Id. at 2446. In the Vance dissent, however, Justice Ginsburg believed that one of the
harassers in Faragher, David Silverman, should not have qualified as a supervisor, as he did not
wield enough authority. Id. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2446 (majority opinion); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747
(1998).
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midlevel manager, had the authority to make hiring and promotion decisions.83
In Faragher, the plaintiff, a lifeguard, accused two fellow employees of
harassment.84 It was fundamentally certain that Bill Terry qualified as the
plaintiff’s supervisor, as he served as the Chief of the Marine Safety Division
and had the authority to hire new lifeguards, supervise all aspects of the
lifeguards’ work assignments, and discipline the staff, among other duties.85
David Silverman provided a more curious case, as he was only responsible for
making the lifeguards’ daily assignments and supervising their work and
fitness training.86 Even though Silverman’s status was debatable, the employer
never argued against the plaintiff’s characterization of both men as
“supervisors,” and, thus, the Court did not address that aspect.87
Ultimately, the Supreme Court successfully resolved the issue regarding
the correct standard of vicarious liability in hostile environment cases, but due
to the nature of the cases, the Court potentially created a different, more
troubling problem by failing to define who qualifies as a “supervisor” under
the new framework.
B.

Trouble with Defining a “Supervisor”

Quickly following the holdings in Ellerth and Faragher, the importance of
recognizing who qualified as a “supervisor” for Title VII purposes became
readily apparent, and the lower courts were tasked with shutting the door left
open by the Supreme Court.88
1.

The Narrow Approach

In 1998, shortly after the twin Ellerth-Faragher holdings, the Seventh
Circuit faced a case dealing with a hostile work environment claim allegedly
involving the victim’s supervisors.89 In Parkins v. Civil Constructors of
Illinois, Inc., the parties disagreed over whether the alleged harassers qualified
as supervisors.90 The court noted that, unfortunately, Title VII did not provide
a definition for the term “supervisor,” as that was a term used by courts in
developing liability standards.91 Accordingly, without any statutory guidance,
the Parkins court recognized that it needed to define the “essential attributes of

83. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.
84. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
85. Id. at 781.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 783.
88. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013).
89. See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998).
90. Id. at 1032–33. The defendant claimed the harassers were supervisors, while the plaintiff
claimed they were only midlevel employees. Id.
91. Id. at 1033.
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a supervisor for purposes of determining employer liability.”92 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that supervisor authority consisted of the ability “to hire,
fire, demote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”93 In other words, supervisory
status hinges on tangible employment action authority—the power “to affect
the terms and conditions” of the subordinate’s employment.94
In subsequent opinions, the Seventh Circuit continued to apply the Parkins
definition of a supervisor.95 In Hall v. Bodine Electric Co., the court applied
the Parkins rule and found that although Lopez, the alleged harasser, “provided
input into [the plaintiff’s] performance evaluations, and [] was charged with
training [the plaintiff] and other less experienced employees . . . none of [this]
is enough to bring Lopez within the definition of a Title VII supervisor.”96
In Joens v. John Morrell & Co., the Eighth Circuit first applied the
Seventh Circuit’s “narrow” supervisor standard.97 About one month later, the
Eighth Circuit encountered the issue of supervisor status again in Weyers v.
Lear Operations Corp. and reinforced its previous decision from Joens by
once again upholding the strict definition.98 In Weyers, the alleged harasser
recommended the defendant’s termination, but the court found that because the
alleged harasser himself did not have the requisite authority to make the final
decision to terminate the defendant, he was not a supervisor.99
2.

The Broad Approach

Nevertheless, while the Eighth Circuit decided to follow the Seventh
Circuit’s narrow approach, the Second Circuit chose a broader approach,
formally creating a split among the circuits.100 As discussed in the introduction,
in Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., the Second Circuit concluded that supervisory
authority is more encompassing than reflected in the Parkins approach.101 The
court believed those who applied the narrow approach misunderstood the real
question to be determined and analyzed whether the employee’s authority
enabled or augmented their ability to create a hostile work environment, rather
than whether they had the authority to make economic decisions.102 In coming

92. Id.
93. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034.
94. Id.
95. See Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002).
96. Id. Even though the alleged harasser had an array of responsibilities, she did not have the
power to make tangible employment decisions, and therefore did not qualify as a supervisor. Id.
97. See Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2004).
98. Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1056–57 (8th Cir. 2004).
99. Id. at 1057.
100. Id. at 1056; see also Muse, supra note 9, at 503.
101. Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003); see also supra notes 1–9
and accompanying text.
102. Mack, 326 F.3d at 126.
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to this conclusion, the Second Circuit adopted the EEOC’s definition of a
supervisor, which stated that “ʻ[a]n individual qualifies as an employee’s
‘supervisor’ if: (a) the individual has the authority to undertake or recommend
tangible employment decisions affecting the employee; or (b) [t]he individual
has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.’”103
The Fourth Circuit embraced the broad approach set forth in Mack, adding
another circuit to the split.104 It was not until Vance v. Ball State University
that the Supreme Court would finally answer the question of who qualifies as a
supervisor for vicarious liability purposes under Title VII.105
III. THE SUPREME COURT DEFINES A SUPERVISOR
A.

Background

In 1989, Maetta Vance, an African American female, began working for
Ball State University as a substitute server in the University Banquet and
Catering division of Dining Services.106 Two years later, Vance was promoted
to a part-time catering position, and, as her career progressed, she became a
full-time catering assistant in 2007.107
However, between promotions, Vance had issues with a fellow Ball State
University employee, Saundra Davis.108 Saundra Davis, a white catering
specialist, served in the same Banquet and Catering division as Vance.109 A
catering specialist has more authority within the Banquet and Catering division
than part-time catering employees, but does not possess the power to “hire,
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline [part-time catering
employees].”110 In 2001, Davis struck Vance on the back of the head after the
two were discussing work-related matters.111 During this discussion, Davis
became aggressive, began shouting, and slapped Vance as she turned to
leave.112 Vance orally complained about this incident, but because Davis had
been transferred to another department for other reasons, Vance did not file
any formal complaints about Davis’s behavior.113

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 127.
Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245 (4th Cir. 2010).
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013).
Id. at 2439.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vance, 133 S. Ct at 2439.
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
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Nevertheless, four years later, Davis returned to Vance’s department, and
controversy returned as well.114 On September 23, 2005, Davis blocked Vance
from exiting an elevator, and said to her, “I’ll do it again,” seemingly referring
to the 2001 incident.115 Vance took action, and on October 17, 2005, she
requested a complaint form from University Compliance, orally complaining
about the slap from four years prior, and in early November, she filed her
complaint about the recent elevator incident with Davis.116 In response, Ball
State investigated the complaint, which revealed contradictory stories of what
happened.117 The University decided the best way to resolve this issue would
be to subject both employees to counseling about respect in the workplace, and
no one was formally disciplined.118 Specifically, Vance was lectured regarding
communicating respectfully in the workplace, but it is unclear whether a
similar conversation ever took place with Davis.119 Shortly thereafter, Vance
overheard Davis using the terms “Sambo” and “Buckwheat” while conversing
with a fellow employee, and Vance believed these words were “be[ing] used in
a racially derogatory way.”120
Apparently having reached a boiling point, Vance filed charges with the
EEOC in late 2005 and early 2006, alleging various forms of discrimination.121
These complaints accused Davis of “glaring at her, slamming pots and pans
around her, and [generally] intimidating her,” especially during the elevator
incident.122 Ball State investigated the incidents Vance alleged but did not find
sufficient evidence to take any disciplinary action.123
After Ball State decided against disciplining any of the parties, Vance filed
a lawsuit in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana, claiming, among other things, that she had been “subjected to a
racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.”124 Specifically, in
her complaint, Vance identified Davis as her “supervisor,” and alleged that
Ball State University was liable for Davis’s racially discriminatory actions.125
After both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor

114. Id. at 466.
115. Id.
116. Vance, 646 F.3d at 466.
117. Id. at 467.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Vance, 646 F.3d at 467. Vance’s EEOC complaint contained allegations of not only race
discrimination, but also age and gender discrimination. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013).
125. Complaint at 5–6, Vance v. Ball State University, No. 1:06-CV-01452-SEB-TAB (S.D.
Ind. Oct. 3, 2006).
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of Ball State University.126 The court believed that because Davis did not have
the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” Vance, Ball
State University could not justly be held vicariously liable for her actions.127
Indeed, the court applied well-established Seventh Circuit precedent.128
Vance pursued her hostile work environment claim on appeal.129 In
affirming the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with
Vance that there was at a minimum a dispute over facts regarding whether
Davis qualified as a “supervisor.”130 The appellate court referred to previous
holdings from inside the circuit, stating that a supervisor is “someone with
power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment,” and this authority “primarily consists of the power to hire, fire,
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.”131 The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged how other circuits have held that only “the authority to direct an
employee’s daily activities” is sufficient to find supervisory status under Title
VII but declined to agree.132 In conclusion, the court found that Vance’s
assertions that Davis had the authority to direct her activities or that Davis did
not have to clock-in like other employees was not enough to qualify her as a
supervisor.133 Therefore, Vance could not recover from Ball State University
unless she could prove negligence, and the court found that she did not meet
that burden.134
Vance appealed the decision of whether Davis qualified as a “supervisor”
to the Supreme Court, and for the first time the United States’ highest judicial
authority would have a chance to answer the question left unanswered by both
Ellerth and Faragher: who qualifies as a “supervisor” for vicarious liability
purposes in Title VII workplace harassment claims?135
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in a majority
opinion written by Justice Alito in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.136 The majority opinion began by calling

126. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2440.
127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.; see also supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
129. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2011).
130. Id. at 470.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2440 (2013).
135. Id. at 2439.
136. Id. at 2438. Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurring opinion, in which he stated that
while he believed that Ellerth and Faragher were decided incorrectly, he joined in the current
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Vance’s argument “misguided” and “incorrect” and said her definition of a
“supervisor” was not supported by general usage of the term, contrary to her
claims.137 In noting that Vance correctly pointed out that the term “supervisor”
could refer to someone who had the “authority to direct another’s work,” the
Court pointed to a competing dictionary that defined the word in terms of the
ability to take “ʻtangible employment actions.’”138 After an extensive
discussion about how the term “supervisor” has many different meanings
across business dictionaries, statutes, and legal authorities,139 the Court came to
the conclusion that “the term ‘supervisor’ has varying meanings both in
colloquial usage and in the law.”140 As a result of this conclusion, the Court
believed it would be incorrect to approach “supervisor” as if it were a statutory
term; instead, the proper way to understand the term would be to “consider the
interpretation that best fits within the highly structured framework” that Ellerth
and Faragher adopted.141
1.

Reviewing Previous Decisions

In the opinion, the Court reviewed the applicable agency principles for
vicarious liability, reiterating that racial and sexual harassment likely fall
outside the scope of employment, which would normally preclude the
employer from liability.142 However, in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court held
section 219(2)(d) to be an exception for situations when the harasser was aided
in accomplishing the actions by the existence of the agency relationship.143
This exception was found to apply in two situations: (1) when the harassment
by the supervisor resulted in tangible employment actions, and (2) when it did
not result in tangible employment actions, but only a hostile work
environment, the employer could be vicariously liable if it failed to establish an
affirmative defense.144 The Court believed it would be too extreme to make
employers strictly liable whenever a supervisor engaged in harassment that did

opinion because it provided the “narrowest and most workable rule” for employer vicarious
liability in harassment cases. Id. at 2454 (Thomas, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2444 (majority opinion).
138. Id.
139. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444–45.
140. Id. at 2446.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2441.
143. Id.
144. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441–42. The affirmative defense the employer must prove is (1)
that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior, and (2)
that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective
opportunities that were provided. Id. at 2442.
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not result in tangible employment action and therefore decided to sanction the
affirmative defense.145
Continuing, the Court reviewed the supervisor characterizations from both
Ellerth and Faragher but noted that because these characterizations were not
disputed in those cases the Court had not been charged with deciding what
degree of authority one must wield in order to achieve supervisory status.146
Agreeing with the dissent, the majority reiterated that employees who had the
ability to control their subordinates’ daily work were certainly capable of
creating “intolerable work environments” but other co-workers were capable of
doing so as well.147 As a result of this observation, the Court found that a
negligence framework provided a better evaluation in situations when the
harasser lacked the power to take tangible employment action.148
After acknowledging that the Ellerth and Faragher holdings failed to
squarely define a supervisor, the Court believed the answer was implicit in the
adopted framework.149 The Court referred to language from Ellerth, and stated
that “[o]nly a supervisor has the power to cause ‘direct economic harm’ by
taking a tangible employment action,” and this authority falls “within the
special province of the supervisor.”150 Elaborating further, the majority
recalled the Court previously found supervisors to be “empowered . . . as a
distinct class of agent[s] to make economic decisions affecting other
employees,” and it could be strongly implied that the power to take tangible
employment action is not simply a characteristic of a subset of supervisors but
is rather the defining characteristic of the entire class.151
2.

Rationalizing the Narrow Holding

The Court rationalized its holding as a concept that could be “readily
applied” and would allow the parties, in most cases, to know if the alleged
harasser was a supervisor before any litigation began.152 This could lead to
settlement of the dispute, and, at the most, the issue would be ripe for summary
judgment.153 Under the approach set forth by the petitioner and the EEOC, the
Court believed that finding supervisor status would often be “murky.”154
Indeed, it cannot be ignored that the current case is illustrative to the vagueness
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2446–47.
147. Id. 2447–48.
148. Id. at 2448.
149. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2449. Justice Alito stated that if the status of the alleged harasser is not known
before litigation begins, it can at least get flushed out in discovery. Id.
153. Id.
154. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449.
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of the EEOC definition, as both Vance and the United States, in its amicus
brief, applied the same “open-ended” test for analyzing Davis’s employment
status but came to different conclusions.155 Finding this discrepancy
predictable, the Court noted that Vance believed since Davis sometimes led or
directed employees in the kitchen, she qualified as a supervisor, while the
United States believed the same facts not to be dispositive on the issue.156
The EEOC definition of a supervisor was articulated in an Enforcement
Guidance,157 which the Court referred to as a “study in ambiguity.”158
Specifically, the majority opinion found that certain terms and phrases used by
the EEOC—“‘sufficient’ authority, authority to assign more than a ‘limited
number of tasks,’ and authority that is exercised more than ‘occasionally’”—
had no clear interpretation and would prove to be troublesome for courts
attempting to apply the definition.159 The Court believed this ambiguity would
force trials to devote ample time to determining the status of the alleged
harasser and, perhaps most troubling, would be far more complex and
confusing for juries to analyze.160 Failing to be persuaded by the argument that
the EEOC’s approach is better equipped to resolve cases in which an alleged
harasser only has the authority to assign unpleasant tasks (inflicting
psychological damage), the Court said victims could still prevail by proving
the employer was negligent in handling the harassment.161 Moreover, juries
would be instructed to consider the degree of authority given as an indicator of
negligence.162 More simply put, the Court believed the standard adopted by the
majority, supplemented by sufficient jury instructions, could be equally
effective in cases where the alleged harasser had certain authority over the
victim but not enough authority to qualify as a supervisor.163
The Court then began responding to certain claims made by the dissent and
started by arguing that the “hierarchical management structure,” which the
dissent assumed to be widely used, was outdated and replaced by an
“overlapping authority” structure.164 Furthermore, the Court rejected the
155. Id.
156. Id. The Government believed that it would not be enough to impugn supervisory status
on Davis since she only “occasionally took the lead in the kitchen.” Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 31, Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434
(2013) (No. 11-556), 2012 WL 3864279.
157. See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
158. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449–50.
159. Id. at 2450.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 2451.
162. Id.
163. See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2451.
164. Id. at 2452. Justice Alito gave the example that members of a team may each be
responsible for different aspects of a task and can direct each other regarding them, thus,
essentially making everyone each other’s supervisors under the EEOC definition. Id.
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contention that the adopted standard would cause employers to insulate
themselves by scaling back authority given to certain positions.165 Lastly, the
Court addressed the dissent’s analysis of previous Title VII cases that would
have been decided differently under the adopted standard, but the Court
countered that it was not clear that any of those cases hinged on the definition
of the “supervisor.”166 Once again, the Court ensured the plaintiffs in those
cases could have argued their employers were negligent in allowing the
harassment to occur.167
3.

Application to the Case at Bar

Finally, the Court addressed the facts of the current case, and held that
Davis did not qualify as a supervisor under the majority view, and likely would
not even qualify as a supervisor under the dissent’s more expansive approach,
as there was “simply no evidence that Davis directed petitioner’s day-to-day
activities,” let alone that she had the authority to make tangible employment
decisions.168
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, articulated by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, advocated for the use of the EEOC
Enforcement Guidance and believed that merely “the authority to direct an
employee’s daily activities establishes supervisory status under Title VII.”169
In coming to this conclusion, the dissent attacked the majority opinion for
being too restrictive in its limitation of both Faragher and Ellerth, ignoring the
realities of the present-day workforce, and disserving the “objective of Title
VII to prevent discrimination from infecting the Nation’s workplaces” in its
discarding of the EEOC definition.170
1.

The Modern Workplace

The dissent, like the majority, recalled Faragher and noted how one of the
alleged harassers, David Silverman, who was found to be a supervisor, likely
would not have qualified as a supervisor under the definition adopted by the
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2453. Possible evidence that plaintiffs could admit would be “[e]vidence that an
employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a
system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed . . . .”
Id.
168. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2454.
169. Id. at 2454–55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2455. Justice Ginsburg stated that in a common workplace, one who is exposed to
co-worker harassment can “walk away or tell the offender to ‘buzz off.’” However, they cannot
say such a thing to a supervisor. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2456.
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majority opinion in the present case.171 Generally, Silverman had the ability to
“punish lifeguards who would not date him [by assigning them] full-time
toilet-cleaning duty;” but, as the dissent pointed out, there was no evidence that
he had the power to take tangible employment action against anyone.172
Providing another example, the dissent cited a Supreme Court case from 2004
where the Court referred to the harasser as a “supervisor” when he only had the
authority to oversee day-to-day activities but nothing more.173 Acknowledging
that these previous cases did not squarely resolve the definition of a supervisor
but still provided guidance, the dissent believed the majority was blind to an
“all-too-plain reality: A supervisor with authority to control subordinates’ daily
work is no less aided in his harassment than is a supervisor with authority to
fire, demote, or transfer.”174 Nevertheless, the dissent argued that the cases
referenced still showed the Court had previously held that “in-charge
superiors” assisted by the agency relationship could create a hostile working
environment.175
In addressing the argument over modern-day workplace realities, the
dissent fortified its conclusion by continuing to pull from real-life examples
involving hostile work environments perpetuated by individuals who were
arguably supervisors.176 After discussing the situations, the dissent highlighted
that the commonality among them was that in each case a “person vested with
authority to control the conditions of a subordinate’s daily work life used his
position to aid his harassment.”177 Interesting enough, none of the harassers in
the examples given would have qualified as a supervisor under the majority’s
strict approach.178
2.

Explaining the EEOC Approach

The dissent then provided a more in-depth analysis of the EEOC
definition, noting how the agency, being charged with enforcing Title VII, had

171. Id. at 2458.
172. Id.
173. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2458. The case Justice Ginsburg briefly alluded to was
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2459. Justice Ginsburg found that what mattered in Faragher is that both men took
advantage of the power vested in them as agents of their employer to create the hostile working
environment. Id. at 2458–59.
176. Id. at 2459–60. Justice Ginsburg analyzed the circumstances from Mack v. Otis Elevator,
326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2003); Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2004);
Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2010); and EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc.,
679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012). Id.
177. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2458.
178. Id.
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applied the definition for fourteen years.179 Perhaps wanting to clear up any
confusion on the leniency of the definition it supported, the dissent reiterated
that an employee “who direct[ed] only a limited number of tasks or
assignments” likely would not qualify as a supervisor, as the harassing
behavior is unlikely to have been a product of the agency relationship with the
employer.180 On the other hand, someone with the authority of such “sufficient
magnitude so as to assist the harasser . . . in carrying out the harassment,”
likely would be considered a supervisor, and the employer would be
vicariously liable because the authority it delegated to said supervisor likely
enabled the harassment to occur.181
3.

Analyzing the Majority Opinion

Turning then to an analysis of the majority’s standard, the dissent accused
the majority of ignoring the “robust protection against workplace
discrimination Congress intended Title VII to secure” by adopting such a
restrictive standard.182 Indeed, the dissent argued the “workable” definition set
forth by the majority was rather unworkable.183 In support, it noted someone
who had the power to reassign another employee with “significantly different
responsibilities” falls under the majority definition, but it questioned what
might really count as “significantly different responsibilities.”184 This was just
one of the deficiencies the dissent alluded to in concluding there is no “crisp
definition” of a supervisor that could provide the “unwavering” bright-line rule
the Court desired.185 The dissent buttressed this observation by showing the
difficulty in applying such a strict standard in certain situations, such as in a
pitching coach and pitcher relationship or the relationship between a law firm
associate and a paralegal.186 In both instances, the former obviously has power
over the latter but is unlikely to be able to take tangible employment action
against them.187
The dissent predicted that the adopted standard would undermine Title
VII’s ability to deter workplace discrimination.188 According to the majority’s
standard, harassment victims would be tasked with the burden of proving
negligence on behalf of the employer in a case where the alleged harasser did

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 2461.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2458.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2463.
Id.
See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463.
Id.
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not have the authority to make tangible decisions.189 This is contrary to Ellerth
and Faragher, which placed the burden on the employer to prove affirmative
defenses, a reasonable task given the heightened ability of the employer to
gather evidence.190
4.

Applying the Dissent to the Case at Bar

Nevertheless, the dissent conceded that in the particular case of Maetta
Vance, Davis would be unlikely to qualify as a supervisor under the EEOC’s
broad definition due to the “slim evidence” put forth by Vance.191 The dissent
concluded its critical approach by calling on Congress to “correct the error into
which this Court has fallen,” and to restore the protections previously afforded
in workplace harassment situations.192
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The majority and dissent both made strong arguments, but which theory is
best? The majority approach claims to have adopted an approach that can be
resolved before trial.193 On the contrary, the dissent believes the question of
supervisory status is on par with the question of whether retaliation or
harassment has actually occurred and “depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”194 Both sides
make a logical argument, which perhaps makes it illogical to deem one
“better.” Therefore, this Note proposes an alternative theory applicable to
hostile work environment cases.
A.

Support for Discarding the Distinction

An alternative approach would be to abolish the need to distinguish
between supervisors and non-supervisors when it comes to employer liability.
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, one of the more influential voices
in the legal profession, proposed the idea of discarding the need to distinguish
between supervisors and co-workers in employment discrimination cases in
dicta in Doe v. Oberweis Dairy.195 In that case, the alleged harasser, a “shift
supervisor” at an ice cream parlor, was responsible for directing the scoopers
and was authorized to issue disciplinary write-ups.196 However, he did not have

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 2464.
Id.
Id. at 2465.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2466.
Id. at 2449 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 716–19 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 717.
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power to take tangible employment action against the scoopers.197 He was
often the only authority figure who worked alongside the scoopers, and Judge
Posner described him as “either an elevated coworker or a diminished
supervisor.”198 Recognizing the support for classifying the alleged harasser as
either a supervisor or a co-worker, Judge Posner stated that there was “no
compelling need to make a dichotomous choice.”199
Fast-forward seven years, and Judge Posner was again addressing the
topic, this time while writing an article reviewing the holding in Vance.200
Judge Posner found both the majority and dissent definitions to be “vague” and
once more declared labeling the harasser as a supervisor or co-worker a
needless task.201 Specifically, he stated:
Cases of employer liability for workplace harassment of one employee by
another can be handled satisfactorily without attempts at classifying the
harasser—attempts further confused by dividing supervisors into those whose
supervisory responsibilities make them “supervisors” for purposes of their
employer’s liability and those whose responsibilities fall short: They are called
202
supervisors and have supervisory duties, but not the right duties.

Furthermore, Judge Posner proposed a “sliding scale” to determine employer
liability, which would hinge on the specific context of each case, such as the
victim’s youth relative to the alleged harasser’s, among other factors.203
1.

A Hypothetical to Consider

Judge Posner was correct when he stated there was not a “compelling”
need to distinguish between supervisors and co-workers.204 Ridding cases of
this distinction will be more favorable to the victims, especially in situations
where the harasser may appear to be a supervisor, but does not qualify under
the strict standard adopted by the Vance majority. A uniform standard would
also provide more benefits than the standard set forth by the dissent in Vance.

197. Id.
198. Id. Justice Ginsburg referred to this passage in a footnote in her dissenting opinion.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2463 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 717.
200. Richard Posner, A Disappointing Supreme Court Decision on Sexual Harassment,
SLATE.COM (June 25, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_
breakfast_table/features/ 2013/supreme_court_2013/sexual_harassment_at_the_supreme_court_
lessons_from_the_ice_cream_store.single.html?print.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. Judge Posner stated, “Our opinion suggested a sliding scale (now superseded
by Vance), whereby the employer’s liability would depend on the contextually significant
practical authority that the employer conferred on the employee who turned out to harass another
employee.” Id.
204. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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Consider the following hypothetical situation: Two lower-level employees,
Abe and Bev, hold the same position at their place of work—a major
corporation; however, Abe has been working there five years longer than Bev.
This seniority gives the impression that Abe possesses power and entitlement
over Bev, even though there is no technical differentiation between their job
duties. Abe starts behaving in a way towards Bev that creates a hostile work
environment, but does nothing that tangibly affects Bev’s employment. Under
both the majority and dissenting approaches, Abe would not qualify as a
supervisor, so the burden would be on Bev to prove the employer’s negligence
in order to pin liability on it. This could prove to be a very difficult burden for
Bev to overcome, as she will be pitted against the unlimited resources of the
major corporation.
B.

The Proposal

The current framework, simply stated, provides that employers are strictly
liable if any tangible employment action results.205 Furthermore, employers are
presumed liable if a hostile environment is created by a supervisor and
presumed not liable if a hostile work environment is created by someone
without power to take tangible employment actions upon the employee, as this
person would not be considered a supervisor, but merely a co-worker.206
1.

The New Framework

Under the proposed approach, an employer would continue to be strictly
liable if any tangible employment actions resulted. However, if a hostile work
environment is found to exist, regardless of whether the alleged harasser is a
supervisor or co-worker, the employer would be presumptively negligent in
allowing the hostile work environment to exist. The employer, nevertheless,
can rebut this presumption by showing that it exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct any harassing behavior, and the plaintiff unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the
employer provided. Essentially, the employer still has the Ellerth and
Faragher affirmative defense at its disposal—proving it was not negligent in
failing to initially prevent the harassment or provide a remedy once it became
privy to the situation. As previously stated, this proposed standard will apply in
all situations, and does not hinge on what kind of authority is possessed by the
individual responsible for creating the hostile work environment.
According to this proposal, the employer will bear the burden of
overcoming the presumption that it was negligent in allowing a hostile work
environment to foster. This may seem like a rather harsh rule for employers to

205. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013).
206. See id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

962

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:939

cope with, and while that argument is not without merit, it is not entirely true.
Employees still have to satisfy the steep burden of establishing that the
harassment complained of was so severe and pervasive that it created an
actionable hostile environment.207 Therefore, it logically follows that if the
harassing conduct was so severe and pervasive, then the employer likely knew
or should have known about it, and should have made an effort to stop or
prevent it. The employers are fairly tasked with explaining the hostile
environment and whether or not it properly handled the situation.
a.

Presumptions Generally

Since this proposal is framed as a rebuttable presumption, it is important to
understand how “presumptions” work in grasping this standard. A presumption
is a “court-made device that says that if a party can prove certain . . . facts, the
court will conclude that an additional fact exists.”208 Here, the “certain facts”
proven would be the plaintiff’s prima facie case showing a hostile work
environment, and the presumed “additional existing fact” would be that the
employer was negligent in allowing the hostile environment. Fundamentally, a
presumption is a “legally mandated conclusion which follows from certain
specific facts.”209 A classic example follows:
[I]f A is proved then B is presumed to be true. Once B is presumed to be true,
and if the presumption is rebuttable, the opposing party must now produce
evidence that B is not true, even though the party who produced evidence of A
210
produced no evidence of B.

Therefore, referring back to the hypothetical about Abe and Bev, after Bev
proves her prima facie case, regardless of the fact that Abe is only a co-worker,
the employer would be presumptively negligent, and the burden would fall on
it to prove otherwise, instead of saddling Bev with the task.211
C. Implications of Adopting the Proposal
There are practical reasons for this proposal, as the employer is truly in
“the best position to know what remedial procedures it offers to employees and
how those procedures operate.”212 Allocating the burden of proof is extremely
important in the United States legal system, and often can have a significant

207. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
208. Candace S. Kovacic-Fleisher, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and
Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 625 (1990).
209. Id.
210. Id. In the above example, applied to the current situation, “A” is the hostile work
environment, and “B” is the employer’s negligence.
211. See supra Part IV.A.1.
212. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146 n.7 (2004).
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impact on the outcome of cases.213 Factual disputes are at the heart of a
plethora of discrimination cases,214 and under the proposed approach, there
will likely still be disputes regarding whether or not the employer was
negligent. Fortunately, however, there will not be the added factual disputes
over whether the alleged harasser was a supervisor or co-worker. As multiple
authorities have previously identified, there is a not a single dominant principle
when it comes to deciding how to allocate the burden of proof.215 However,
some important factors include “issues of policy, convenience, fairness, and
probability.”216 It is undoubtedly more convenient and fair for the employer to
prove that it was not negligent in the handling of the hostile work environment
than it would be for the employee to prove the opposite.
Forcing a presumption of negligence on the employer could exponentially
benefit the modern workplace. As Justice Ginsburg has understood, “[w]hen
employers know they will be answerable for the injuries a harassing jobsite
boss inflicts, their incentive to provide preventative instruction is
heightened.”217 However, under the proposed standard, Justice Ginsburg’s
observation not only applies to jobsite bosses but to regular employees as well.
This will encourage employers to be extremely careful in hiring practices,
remedial procedures, and general overseeing of the entire staff. Employers will
make sure to do everything in their power to be able to produce a solid
argument in response to potentially being found presumptively negligent when
any type of hostile environment exists at their workplace. While this may be
somewhat of a harsh standard, the benefits largely outweigh the negatives.
D. Applying the Proposal to the Case at Bar
Applying the proposed standard to the Vance fact-pattern, Ball State
University would likely be successful in rebutting the presumption of
negligence. Ball State investigated the complaints made by Vance, and
although it decided against discipline, the University still did its due diligence
in addressing the situation.218 It is important to note that the burden would rest
with Ball State in providing the evidence of its investigations and remedial
procedures, as Maetta Vance would only need to prove her prima facie case.
Under this standard, the parties would need not spend time and money arguing
over whether or not Davis qualified as a supervisor and could devote their

213. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward A
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1206–07 (1981).
214. Id. at 1207.
215. Kovacic-Fleisher, supra note 208, at 622.
216. Id. Some things to consider in regards to convenience and fairness are which party has
better knowledge and access to the information. Id. at 623.
217. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2464 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218. See supra notes 116–117, 122 and accompanying text.
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resources to litigating the actual merits of the case. Thus, this case is
illustrative of the notion that the proposed standard is fair to both sides—even
though it appears rather strict for employers at first impression, it will provide
justice in all situations.
CONCLUSION
Vicarious liability for the actions of supervisors has been a very fluid area
of law for the past quarter-century. In the landmark decisions of Ellerth and
Faragher, the Supreme Court held that agency principles apply in attaching
vicarious liability, but due to the broad-sweeping nature of the “aided by the
agency relationship” concept, which would attach vicarious liability to
employers in virtually all scenarios, the Court created an affirmative defense to
serve as a limitation to employer liability. However, what the Court failed to
hold—the requirements to qualify as a supervisor—proved to cause
shockwaves through the lower courts who tried to apply the standard from
Ellerth and Faragher. Attempting to define who qualified as a supervisor, the
circuits became split on whether an individual needed to have the authority to
take tangible employment actions against another to be considered a supervisor
or rather only needed the ability to direct the day-to-day activities of others.
These conflicting views are what led to the decision in Vance, where the
Supreme Court was finally able to address the circuit split.
It is as curious as it is troubling for exactly why the Supreme Court in
Ellerth and Faragher did not address the issue of who definitively qualifies as
a supervisor, as a simple reading of those opinions reveals that the status of the
harasser is essentially a cornerstone to the whole standard. The logical reason
appears to be that because the parties did not dispute the status of the harassers,
the Court was not required to address the topic. However, the Supreme Court
seems to have developed a pattern of leaving important questions open,
perhaps waiting until a “perfect” record arises to firmly establish certain
standards. While this could be considered a practical strategy, it has proven to
cause much difficulty to the lower courts in trying to apply the Supreme
Court’s holdings.
The alternative proposal set forth by this Note will do away with any
uncertainty in regards to whether or not the standard for vicarious liability
would apply. Eliminating the need to distinguish between who qualifies as a
supervisor or co-worker will prove to be much more workable for the lower
courts. Even though, technically, there should not be any more confusion in the
wake of the Vance definition, it is still doubtful whether the Vance definition is
truly the best avenue. This doubt is especially present in light of the very
legitimate arguments set forth in the dissenting opinion. When two sides of an
argument can both give compelling reasons in support of their stance, and
when an alternative solution exists to eliminate the need to decide between the
two sides, the alternative solution should be implemented.
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Additionally, the proposed standard will result in employers being much
more careful and diligent in hiring practices and workplace procedures, which
can only result in a better workplace for everyone involved. Therefore, using
the alternative solution proposed here, of eliminating the status of the alleged
harasser as a dispositive factor, is one step in satisfying the goals of Title VII
in creating a more equal and safer workplace, free of discrimination and
harassment.
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